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Length of Contracts and the Effect on 
the Performance of MLB Players  
 
KATIE STANKIEWICZ
I. Introduction 
 
Fans of Major League Baseball (MLB) teams come to 
the ballpark to see some of their favorite players on 
the field.  It is the responsibility of the owner and 
general manager to provide these players to their 
fans.  This is accomplished by drawing up contracts 
for each player so that the players will be 
compensated for bringing the fans to the ballpark.  A 
lot of money is spent by the fans to come see these 
players and that money is used by the owners to pay 
the players the amounts specified in the contracts.  
Since the owners and fans are spending so much 
money they want to ensure that they are receiving 
the best return for their investment.  In other words, 
owners and fans expect MLB players to perform to 
their potential in every game. 
 
The focus of this paper is to see if the length of a 
contract will have an effect on a player’s 
performance during the period of that contract.  The 
objective is to see whether a player is more 
productive with a one year contract, which is 172 
days on a Major League roster, or a multi-year 
contract, which is four to seven years (Meltzer, 
2005).  Long-term contracts were not common in 
MLB until after free agency was developed in 1977.  
Today these contracts are rarely used for players who 
have below average skills, little experience, or are 
nearing their retirement age.  The type of contract is 
important because teams have to pay each player the 
amount specified in the contracts even if a player 
does not meet performance expectations, becomes 
injured and cannot play, or is released from the team 
(Meltzer, 2005 and Dinerstein, 2007).  Teams 
attempt to predict the future performance of a player 
before they decide which contract to offer him 
(Dinerstein, 2007 and Maxcy, 2004).  However, 
owners have to be concerned about whether or not a 
player will shirk with a guaranteed contract 
(Krautmann, 1990).  Shirking is when a player 
purposely does not perform to the best of his ability 
and may occur when a player has a guaranteed 
salary.  A longer contract gives a player more 
opportunity to shirk without losing their salary.  This 
study will use productivity measures to determine if 
players actually do shirk when they have a multi-
year contract. 
 
The ability for teams and players to negotiate 
contracts will be affected by the negotiation status of 
a player.  Contract lengths for players that have been 
in the majors for less than six years are not 
determined by free negotiations.  Owners have an 
advantage over the players during these first six 
years since players are not able to freely move 
around the league.  As a result, the data in this paper 
will only include players that are free agents. 
 
Contract theory is the underlying theory for 
determining the significance of contract length on 
productivity.  Teams and players will have risk 
preferences that will drive the choice of a contract.  
Owners will have to balance market and production 
uncertainty when they decide which contract to offer 
a player.  The hypothesis of this paper is that, with 
other factors held constant, contract length will have 
a significant effect on the productivity of a player, 
and one-year contracts will cause players to be more 
productive than players with longer term contracts. 
To test this hypothesis an OLS regression will be run 
with the productivity of a player as the dependent 
variable and contract length (as well as control 
variables) as the independent variables. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Using economic theories to analyze professional 
sports, particularly baseball, has become very 
popular over the last few decades.  Multiple studies 
have been conducted that address the contracts, 
salaries and performance of MLB players.  Some of 
these studies look at how previous performances will 
affect the contract length and the salary that the 
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player will receive (Meltzer, 2005; Dinerstein, 2007; 
and Tarman, 2005).  These studies look at how 
owners evaluate players and examine contract 
determination from the perspective of the teams.  
They are also solid starting places for this study. 
 
The common focus of contract studies is the 
relationship between performance and the salary or 
contract length of a player.  In these studies the 
dependent variable is contract length or salary, and 
the independent variable is the productivity of the 
player.    One of these studies was performed by Josh 
Meltzer (2005), who used a first stage regression to 
determine if performance is a significant predictor of 
a salary for a MLB player.  His regression results 
demonstrated that performance is a significant 
predictor, which confirmed his hypothesis and the 
conclusion of other researchers.  These results mean 
that the better player will receive a longer contract 
and often will lead to a salary premium on top of the 
length of the received contract (Meltzer, 2005).  
Therefore, young players that are improving and 
performing well will receive longer contracts while 
players who are injured or do not perform well will 
receive shorter contracts. 
 
Krautmann and Oppenheimer (2002) perform a 
similar study linking contract length to the salary of 
a MLB player.  The authors performed an OLS 
regression and determined that contract length is 
positively related to wages.  Earlier in their study, 
Krautmann and Oppenheimer determined, based on 
their work and previous studies, that superior 
players tend to receive higher salaries.  
Consequently, contract length has a positive 
relationship to wages, since the best players will 
receive the longest contracts in addition to the 
highest salaries.  These studies are very important to 
this research because they provide proof that a 
strong relationship exists between contract length 
and the performance of a player. This paper is 
furthering the existing research on this issue by 
determining if contract length will have a significant 
impact on how productive a player will be for the 
team.  Contract length is also positively related to the 
past productivity of a player.  However, issuing a 
long-term contract could result in a moral hazard 
regarding future productivity.  The players know 
they have a guaranteed salary for a given period of 
time, and there is less incentive to perform to the 
best of their ability for that given period.  The 
dependent variable of the previous studies now 
becomes the independent variable for this study. 
In addition to proving the existence of a relationship 
between contract length and performance, the 
studies of Meltzer and Krautmann and Oppenheimer 
offer important variables to be included in this 
study.  The dependent variable in my study is the 
performance of a MLB player during the years of 
their contract.  Some common measurements of a 
player's productivity are the slugging percentage, the 
on base percentage (OBP), and the on base 
percentage plus slugging (OPS) of a player 
(Krautmann 1990; Dinerstein, 2007; Maxcy, 2004; 
Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002; and Tarman, 
2005).  The OBP is the percentage of times a player 
successfully reaches base without the other team 
making an error.  The slugging percentage is the 
total number of bases that a player receives per at-
bat (Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002).  For 
example, if a player hits a home run he is credited 
with four bases.  The OPS adds these two measures 
of productivity together and is often viewed as the 
best measure of productivity.  A problem associated 
with OPS is that the statistic does not account for the 
amount of playing time a player has.  This could be 
addressed by including a variable for a player’s plate 
appearances.  As a result, I have chosen to use the 
equivalent average (the total offensive value of a 
player per out) as my productivity measure, as it 
includes the plate appearances of a player in 
addition to the components included in OPS. 
 
Naturally, there are important variables to control 
for when evaluating a player's productivity.  One of 
these variables is the age of the player (Meltzer, 
2005; Berri and Krautmann, 2006; Dinerstein, 
2007; Maxcy, 2004; and Krautmann and 
Oppenheimer, 2002).  Age can act as a proxy to 
experience for a MLB player and the more 
experienced that a player is, the more productive he 
tends to be (Maxcy, 2005).  Players will learn 
techniques to help them get through a long season 
and with better results (Dinerstein, 2007).  The 
development of such techniques is one reason that 
older players tend to receive longer contracts 
(Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002).  However, 
there is an age where a player's productivity will 
begin to decrease due to loss of skill or increased 
probability of injury, and this may cause the player 
to receive shorter contracts (Maxcy, 2005; Berri and 
Krautmann, 2006; and Maxcy, 2004).  Therefore, 
age will be included as an independent variable in 
this study. 
  
Another important aspect of player performance that 
these studies address is that players get injured.  
When they are injured they are not able to 
participate in games, which decreases their 
productivity.  A similar conclusion that these papers 
reach is that players with long-term contracts tend to 
be on the disabled list (Berri and Krautmann, 2006).  
In fact, as the number of years in the contract 
increases, the number of days that a player spends 
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on the disabled list increases by 25% (Krautmann, 
1990).  Berri and Krautmann used games played as 
proxy to account for the effect of injury on a player’s 
productivity.  I have chosen to also use games played 
to account for injuries sustained by players during 
the period of their contracts. 
 
Outside forces can also affect how a player will 
perform on the field, such as the ability of his 
manager.  The manager acts as head coach for the 
professional team and his ability to motivate and 
teach will effect how well a player will perform.  
Therefore, a successful coach will provide more tools 
to the players to make them more productive on the 
field than an unsuccessful coach (Berri and 
Krautmann, 2006).  To control for managerial 
quality I have included the manager’s winning 
percentage for each player in my data over the length 
of the contract. 
  
There were many more variables that these studies 
included that I have elected not to use in my study.  
Some of these variables include team chemistry, 
shirking during the off-season (Berri and 
Krautmann, 2006), attitude, hustle, and intelligence 
(Maxcy, 2004).  Each of these variables has a 
positive effect on how well a player will perform 
while playing with their team.  However, these are 
difficult to quantify.  As a result, these variables will 
not be included in my empirical model. 
 
The idea of a player shirking was briefly addressed in 
the introduction of this study.  Shirking is a very 
important concept because it could explain why a 
player is not as productive while under a multi-year 
contract.  It is a common thought that players will 
put forth less effort when they have a long-term 
contract, and proven shirkers will develop a bad 
reputation, decreasing their chance of receiving a 
long-term contract (Berri and Krautmann, 2006).  A 
player can shirk during the off-season just as easily 
as they can during the season.  Players may not put 
in the necessary training time or eat properly, which 
will cause them to be less productive (Berri and 
Krautmann, 2006).  However, it is also possible for 
owners to misinterpret a less productive year for a 
player as shirking.  The owners of a team might offer 
a long-term contract to an average player after he 
has completed an exceptionally productive season, 
but after this very strong performance the player 
may naturally return to his average performance 
(Krautmann, 1990).  Even with this possibility, it is 
important to consider the aspect of shirking when 
looking at multi-year contracts. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the negotiation 
status of a player affects the type of contract that 
player will be offered.  One possibility for a MLB 
player is that he can become eligible for arbitration.  
A player becomes eligible after three years in MLB 
(Kahn, 1993).  Once a player is arbitration-eligible, 
he can sign a new contract, but only with his current 
team.  Arbitration gives a player the chance to 
negotiate for a higher salary but he cannot leave the 
team (Tarman, 2005).  A player is eligible for free 
agency after six years in MLB (Kahn, 1993).  Free 
agency allows a player to sign with any team in the 
league so they do not have to remain with the team 
they are currently on.  Andrew Tarman states that 
because arbitration and free agency exist, "…all 
players in baseball are not in a truly competitive 
market." (1993). In his results, Kahn discovers that 
free agency will increase contract duration (Kahn, 
1993).  This is due to the fact that free agency puts 
extra risk on a team and long-term contracts will 
help to mitigate it (Maxcy, 2004).  Therefore, players 
within these stages of their careers are not acting 
independently of the team when contracts are 
negotiated.  As a result, there are no players that are 
eligible for arbitration or their first year of free 
agency in my data. 
   
III. Theory 
 
In order to understand how contracts affect MLB 
players, it is crucial to understand contract theory in 
general and how it relates to the overall workforce.  
Owners and players have risk preferences that will 
affect their decisions.  When salary is held constant 
for both types of contracts, the players will favor the 
long-term contract.  Players desire a long-term 
contract to have a guaranteed income over multiple 
years.  In this situation, owners will prefer short-
term contracts so they do not have to pay the athlete 
for so long a period.  Offering a player a long-term 
contract does not just involve a monetary cost for 
owners but also the cost of uncertainty toward a 
player’s future productivity. 
 
Joel Maxcy (2004) discusses the idea of productive 
uncertainty of a worker.  Productive uncertainty is 
when a firm (in this case a ball club) is unsure of how 
well the worker (a player) will perform his job in the 
present as well as in the future.  Baseball players will 
receive a short-term contract if owners are less 
certain about their future production.  Young players 
will receive short-term contracts because they have 
yet to prove how productive they can be for the team.  
Older players also tend to receive short-term 
contracts because their productive uncertainty 
increases with their age.  Even if they had proven 
that they were productive early in their career, older 
players are not able to perform at the same level as 
younger players and become more prone to injury.  
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Therefore teams will offer long-term contracts to 
players in the middle of their careers who have 
proven they will have consistent productivity.  
However, productive uncertainty is not the only 
issue owners have to deal with. 
 
Productive uncertainty only addresses the question 
of how a player is going to perform and not how 
difficult it may be for an owner to replace a player.  
Market uncertainty refers to how easy it will be for a 
firm to find a worker that is equivalent to or better 
than the current worker.  Maxcy (2004) found that 
market uncertainty will increase the chance of a 
player receiving a long-term contract.  This is 
because a team protects itself from the risk of being 
unable to replace the skill level of the player.  This is 
especially true for star players, who are very difficult 
to replace with players possessing similar abilities.  
In other words, Maxcy found that the players who 
receive long-term contracts are those that are least 
likely to be replaced (Meltzer, 2005). 
 
The combination of market uncertainty and 
productive uncertainty creates a complex decision 
for the owners of a team.  An aging player 
exemplifies this difficulty.  Older age suggests that 
the player should receive a short-term contract but 
his uniqueness suggests a long-term contract 
(Tarman, 2005).  Maxcy (2004) reconciles this 
problem by stating that if the market uncertainty of a 
player is greater than his productive uncertainty, an 
owner should offer a long-term contract.  The 
hypothesis for this paper is that even though the 
player is a star player, the effect of aging (and 
therefore productive uncertainty) will take 
precedence in the owners’ decision, and a shorter 
contract will be offered as the player nears the end of 
his career. 
   
However, Maxcy’s model does not include every 
aspect of contract theory.  Allen and Lueck (2001) 
present the idea of shirking during a contract period.  
This model assumes that only the agent can shirk, 
but in reality the principal can shirk as well.  For 
example, a firm may not provide all the necessary 
equipment for the worker to be productive.  
Therefore, this is a source of potential moral hazard.  
Allen and Lueck (2001) also present the transaction 
cost framework that is present in contract theory.  
The framework states that a principal (the firm) will 
create the terms of a contract while considering any 
transaction costs.  These costs may include paying 
for the worker’s training, building any incentives 
into the contract, and monitoring of the worker’s 
productivity.  In order to have a complete 
understanding of the effect of contracts on a player’s 
productivity, these two frameworks will be 
combined. 
 
The tradeoffs of long-term contracts are felt by both 
the player and the owner.  When players sign a long-
term contract, they forfeit the opportunity to sign for 
a higher salary if their performance improves in the 
future (Meltzer, 2005).  Owners risk a player’s 
potential injury or performance decline throughout 
the contract period.  Even if this occurs, the owner 
must continue to pay the player the salary listed in 
the terms of the contract (Meltzer, 2005).  Owners 
also have to accept the risk of a player shirking 
during the long-term contract.  Some owners rely on 
the incentives built into the contract to prevent a 
player from shirking (Berri and Krautmann, 2006).  
A player may still choose to shirk because his salary 
is locked in regardless of his performance.  
Therefore, he will shirk until the last year of his 
contract when he will perform the best he can to 
convince owners that he is worth having on their 
team (Dinerstein, 2007).  A player exerts this extra 
effort in the last year of his contract because he 
expects significant benefits, such as a longer contract 
period.  The results of Dinerstein’s empirical study 
on this subject offer proof that players tend to try 
harder during a contract year. 
 
IV. Data 
 
The data to test my hypothesis come from two major 
sources.  All of the productivity statistics are 
available from the website baseballreference.com.  
This website does not explicitly state the equivalent 
average for MLB players, but it does provide each of 
the statistics that are needed to calculate equivalent 
average (EqA).  EqA is calculated by (hits + total 
bases + 1.5*(walks + hit by pitch) + stolen bases) / 
(total number of at bats + walks + hit by pitch + 
number of times caught stealing + (stolen bases / 3))  
(http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?ar
ticleid=2596).  When collecting the data for players 
with multi-year contracts, the equivalent average, 
games played, coach’s success, age, and age² 
statistics are averaged across the time of the 
contract.  Descriptive statistics for each of these 
variables can be found in Table 1.  The data for each 
player’s contracts come from the website 
http://www.bluemanc.demon.co.uk/baseball/ 
mlbcontracts.htm (Meltzer, 2005).1 
 
                                                 
1
 This website has been since removed but it can be found 
by using the archive website 
http://web.archive.org/web/web.php. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
I have included one hundred different players and 
their statistics.  Fifty of these players have a one-year 
contract, and the other fifty have a multi-year 
contract.  The players in this study represent each of 
the positions of a MLB team except for pitchers.  
Pitching statistics are less universal than hitting 
statistics, and there are different types of pitchers.  
Each type of pitcher (starting and relief) has 
different statistics and responsibilities, making it 
difficult to measure a pitcher’s productivity 
(Krautmann, 1990).  As a result, not all pitchers are 
measured the same way.  Position players are all 
measured in the same way when they are hitting, 
which offers a consistent measure of productivity 
(Meltzer, 2005). 
 
Also absent in this study is a measure of a player’s 
defensive ability.  The statistics available to measure 
defense represent the mistakes that a player makes 
rather than a player’s ability to make exceptional 
plays (Meltzer, 2005).  For example, the fielding 
percentage of a player remains at one and it only 
decreases as a player makes an error.  However, it 
will not increase if a player makes an extraordinary 
play.  Without the ability to measure exceptional 
plays on defense, there is no accurate way to 
measure the productivity of a player’s defensive 
ability.  In addition to this, a player is acting 
independently of his teammates when he is hitting.  
The completion of a defensive play often depends on 
a player’s teammates (Dinerstein, 2007).  In other 
words, defensive statistics are not included in this 
study because of their ambiguity. 
 
The main restriction of this data set is that it only 
includes published contracts.  This means that this 
sample is not complete or random.  For example, 
there are some players who do not have a major 
league contract but play at the major league level for 
a few games during a season due to injuries.  These 
players are not represented in this data set.  Neither 
are players with options such as an extension of a 
contract for an extra year at a fixed salary that 
veteran players may have on their contracts.   
 
V. Empirical Model 
 
By combining all of the variables 
mentioned in the previous sections, an 
empirical model is created that will test 
the hypothesis that a one year contract 
will result in greater productivity of a 
MLB player.  The model is: 
 
Productivity of Player = α+β1(one-year  
     contract)+β2(age)+β3(age2)+β4(games  
            played)+ β5(coach’s success) 
 
I expect each coefficient to have a positive sign, 
except for the age² coefficient, which will have a 
negative sign.  The variables are summarized in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Variable Definitions 
 
A one-year contract may have a positive effect on the 
productivity of a player due to the pressure it 
produces. A player only has one year to prove to the 
manger, general manager, and owner that he is 
beneficial to the team.  In order to do so, the player 
has to put forth his best effort during the one-year 
contract.  Even if the player wants to leave his 
current team, a one-year contract will still encourage 
him to perform to the best of his ability, so that other 
teams see he is worth acquiring. 
 
The age² variable is included in this model due to the 
aging of the players.  As a player gets older he 
becomes more productive as he learns new 
techniques and adjusts to the demands of a 
professional baseball career.  However, as the player 
continues to age his body will eventually be unable to 
continue at the same pace or level he was at during 
his early career.  Therefore, there is an inverted 
 One-Year 
Contract 
Multi-Year 
Contract 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent     
    EqA 0.75920 0.08795 0.85660 .09882 
Independent     
    Age 29.46 3.82905 30.11 3.75702 
    Games Played 123.74 29.08384 130.608 27.16546 
    Coach’s success 0.49216 0.04263 0.50143 .04511 
Variable Definition 
Dependent  
EqA Total offensive value per out 
Independent  
One-year contract        
              (+) 
Dummy; 1=one-year contract,  
0=multi-year 
Age       (+) The age of the player 
Age²     (-) The age of the player squared 
Games Played  
              (+) 
The number of games played by 
the player 
Coach’s success  
              (+) 
The winning percentage of the 
player’s coach 
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relationship between the age and productivity of a 
player. 
 
I will run this model using OLS regression to 
determine the significance of each of the coefficients 
to the independent variables.  Once the regression is 
run, it will be possible to see if contract length has an 
effect on productivity. 
 
VI. Results 
 
The results of the OLS regression are summarized in 
the following table: 
 
Table 3:  Regression Results 
 
Variables Model A Model B 
One-Year 
Contract 
-.084 *** 
(-4.853) 
-.084 *** 
(-4.929) 
Age -.020 
(-.674) 
-.020 
(-.629) 
Age2 .000 
(.807) 
.000 
(.860) 
Games Played .001 *** 
(4.519) 
.001 *** 
(4.649) 
Coach's 
Success 
.098 
(.492) 
---- 
Adjusted R2 .350 .355 
N=100 
Values in parenthesis represent absolute T-statistics 
*significant at .10 level  
**significant at .05 level 
***significant at .01 level 
 
The first regression includes each of the variables in 
the empirical model and is represented by Model A 
in the table above.  Model A has an adjusted R2 of 
.350 and only two of the variables prove to be 
significant at any level (.1, .05, or .01).  These 
variables are the one-year contract variable and the 
games played variable.  Both variables are highly 
significant with a significance value of .000.  Model 
A supports the hypothesis that contract length does 
affect productivity when everything else is held 
constant.  However, the sign in front of the one-year 
contract variable does not match the predicted sign.  
In Model A’s results, the one-year contract variable 
has a negative sign which implies that a player with a 
one-year contract will be less productive relative to a 
player with a long-term contract.  The coefficient for 
this variable is -.084.  This means that if a player has 
a one-year contract, the equivalent average (and 
therefore productivity) of a player will decrease by 
.084.  This result goes against the hypothesis that a 
one-year contract will cause a player to be more 
productive. 
 
The games played variable is also highly significant 
and it demonstrates the predicted sign.  However, 
the coefficient is miniscule, with a value of .001.  The 
amount of games that a player plays in will have a 
positive effect on the productivity of a player 
(everything else held constant), but an increase of 
one game will increase the equivalent average by 
.001.  The rest of the variables were all insignificant.  
The most insignificant variable is the coach’s success 
variable.  This result implies that a coach’s ability to 
lead a team will not have a significant effect on the 
productivity of a player.  This supports the assertion 
that baseball is an independent sport.  Another very 
interesting result from this model is that both age 
and age2 variables are insignificant.  A player’s 
productivity is not affected by his age at all, which 
goes against all previous studies performed and 
baseball logic. 
 
Model B is an attempt to improve the first 
regression.  In order to do this the coefficient that 
was the most insignificant, coach’s success, was 
removed from the regression.  Once this variable was 
removed, the adjusted R2 increases to .355.  This 
implies that this model is a slight improvement over 
the original Model A.  The one-year contract variable 
and the games played variable are as highly 
significant as they had been in Model A.  In fact, 
both of these variables maintain the exact same 
coefficient and signs as they demonstrated in Model 
A.  Unfortunately, the age and age2 variables are still 
insignificant.  Therefore, when included in this 
model age will not have any effect on the 
productivity of a MLB player. 
 
The results of this study suggest that contract length 
does have an effect on the productivity of a MLB 
player.  The causation of this result could be 
debated.  Some may believe that the productivity and 
talent of a player will determine his contract length.  
This causation is true for the contract year of a MLB 
player.  How well a player performs during his 
contract, particularly the contract year, will have a 
considerable effect on the next contract the owners 
will offer the player.  Owners need to be cautious 
when determining the contract for a player because a 
player that performs extremely well may be having 
an unusual season (Dinerstein, 2007).  A player may 
have the best season of his career, be offered a long-
term contract by a team, and then return to his 
natural level of talent the next year.  The player does 
not intentionally perform worse than the year before, 
but he had an extraordinary previous season and 
players will naturally move back to their ability level 
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(Dinerstein, 2007).  This paper is looking at the 
situation in which a player has already determined 
what kind of contract he deserves.  The performance 
of the player may change due to the possibility that 
he might shirk during a long-term contract.  A one-
year contract will always create the situation of a 
contract year, and players will need to prove that 
they deserve another contract.  Therefore, a long-
term contract and a one-year contract may have 
different effects on how productive a player will 
choose to be. 
 
The hypothesis of this paper is that a one-year 
contract would cause a player to be more productive 
than a player with a long-term contract.  The thought 
behind this hypothesis was that a player with a long-
term contract would take advantage of the 
guaranteed salary and shirk during a few of the years 
covered by the contract.  However, this study has 
proven that this is not the case.  It showed that a 
player with a short-term contract will be less 
productive than a player with a long-term contract.  
This result supports the work of the previous studies.  
This regression may have produced this answer due 
to the absence of some important variables, such as 
team chemistry and shirking during the off-season.  
These variables may cause players to be more or less 
productive during their season, and may therefore 
change the regression results. 
 
This model does not differentiate between the 
different types of players in MLB.  It needs to be 
adjusted because the type of player may have an 
effect on what type of contract a player is receiving.  
For example, a young player with no experience in 
the major leagues will likely be offered a short-term 
contract because he has not proven to the owners 
that there is a reward for the risk the owners are 
taking by signing him.  The opposite is true for a 
“star player.”  These are the players that attract fans 
to the ballpark and are household names.  Examples 
of these kinds of players are Derek Jeter, Frank 
Thomas, Cal Ripken Jr., Babe Ruth, and Jackie 
Robinson.  These players have proven that they are 
the best the league can offer, and so there is far less 
risk signing them to a long-term contract.  Also, 
these players are the better players in baseball, so 
they will automatically have a higher productivity 
than those players with a one-year contract, even if 
they engage in shirking behavior.  Therefore, the 
model should include a variable that represents the 
“star power” of a player due to the fact that the more 
“star power” a player has, the more likely it is that he 
will receive a long-term contract. 
 
The results of this study may also be biased because 
other variables are left out.  These variables include 
team chemistry, attitude, hustle, and intelligence 
(Maxcy, 2004).  The productivity of a player will be 
affected by how well he works with his teammates 
and how well they know the sport of baseball.  
Perhaps the most important variable not included in 
this study is the ability of a player to shirk during the 
off-season, as presented by Berri and Krautmann 
(2006).  If a player does not take care of himself or 
prepare himself for the season he will not be as 
productive as he could be. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Society today is filled with people who love to win 
and who love watching winners.  These people 
demand that their sports teams are set up for the 
best chance to win.  The responsibility to provide 
these teams to the fans falls on the owners.  Fans will 
come to the ballparks when they are confident that 
their teams are going to do well.  Owners of MLB 
teams can now increase the chance of a team doing 
well by looking at the contract length of a player to 
determine how productive a team will be.  Based on 
this study, offering long-term contracts to players 
may have a small advantage for the owners, but the 
true effect of the contract will depend on what type 
of player is receiving it. 
 
By offering players long-term contracts and thus 
increasing the productivity of the players, owners 
will increase their profits.  A more productive team 
will increase the likelihood of a victory and also the 
number of people who will be willing to come watch 
the team.  People will come and enjoy the winning 
atmosphere, and as a result they will spend more 
money on team merchandise and on return trips.  
However, by choosing to offer more long-term 
contracts, some players may not be able to play in 
the major leagues.  Only those players that provide a 
high enough reward over the risk of the contract for 
the owner will be offered a MLB contract.  The 
competition to be a MLB baseball player will 
increase dramatically, and some players may not be 
given the opportunity to prove their worth. 
 
To determine if these consequences are realistic, 
more studies should be performed with this topic.  
Another study should be completed which includes a 
variable to represent the “star power” of a player.  
With this variable included in the model, it could 
decrease some of the significance of contract length.  
Salary could be used as a factor of how much “star 
power” a player has, because the best players tend to 
have the highest salaries.  Also, other studies should 
attempt to quantify the ability of a player to shirk 
during the off-season.  This variable could have a 
strong impact on how productive a player will be, 
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and if they are worth the risk of a long-term contract.  
This study may have elements of a sample bias 
problem as there are many restrictions to the data.  
Finding a way to account for arbitration and free 
agency eligibility will increase the data set and will 
also be more realistic of the MLB players market. 
 
Further work on this topic will offer owners vital 
information on how to create their teams, decrease 
their risk, and increase their profits.  Fans in many 
cities would be much happier with their teams, and 
more people will be interested in becoming fans.  
This study is a good step towards further research on 
the relationship between contract length and 
productivity, and its continuation could improve the 
world of MLB contracts. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Allen, Douglas W. and Dean Lueck.  “Risk  
Preferences and the Economics of  
Contracts.” American Economic Review, 1995, 
85(2), pp. 447-51. 
 
Baseball Reference. <http://www.baseball-
reference.com>. 
 
Berri, David J. and Anthony C. Krautmann.  
“Shirking on the Court: Testing for the 
Incentive  
Effects of Guaranteed Pay.”  Economic  
Inquiry, 2006, 44(3), pp. 536-46. 
 
Dinerstein, Michael.  Free Agency and Contract  
Options: How Major League Baseball Teams 
Value Players.  2005, Department of 
Economics, Stanford University, CA. 
 
Kahn, Lawrence.  “Free Agency, Long-Term 
Contracts and Compensation in Major League  
Baseball.”  The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 1993, 75 (1), pp. 157-164. 
 
Krautmann, Anthony C.  “Shirking or Stochastic  
Productivity in Major League Baseball.”  
Southern Economic Association, 56 (4), pp.  
961-968. 
 
Krautmann, Anthony C. and Margaret 
Oppenheimer.  “Contract Length and the 
Return to Performance in Major League 
Baseball.” Journal of Sports Economics, 2002, 
3(6), pp. 6-17. 
 
 
 
 
Maxcy, Joel.  “Motivating Long-Term Employment  
Contracts: Risk Management in Major  
League Baseball.”  Managerial and Decision  
Economics, 2004, 25, pp. 109-120. 
 
Meltzer, Josh.  “Average Salary and Contract 
Length in Major League Baseball:  When Do 
They Diverge?” 2005, Department of 
Economics, Stanford University, CA. 
 
Miceli, Thomas J.  “A Principal-Agent Model of  
Contracting in Major League Baseball.”  
Journal of Sports Economics, 2004, 5(2), 
pp. 213-20. 
 
MLB Contracts. <http://web.archive.org/web/*/ 
http://www.bluemanc.demon.co.uk/baseball/
mlbcontracts.htm>. 
 
Tarman, Andrew.  “The Effect of Monopsony 
Power in Major League Baseball on the Salaries 
of Players with Less than Six Years in the 
Majors.”  Illinois Wesleyan University: Senior 
Honors Project, 2005. 
 
 
